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Abstract 
The difference between supply and demand of transplantable organs is a global problem 
and one of the most discussed measures aiming to solve it is the implementation of a 
presumed consent (opt-out) policy in cadaveric organ donation. This kind of system is 
controversial both when it comes to its direct effects on organ donation rates and its 
ethical base. We aim to present the latest perspectives concerning the ethical implications 
of the policy, specially regarding consent: its need, the coherence of presuming it and the 
policy’s capacity to fulfill its requirements. Regarding the issue at hand, a community 
perspective, the effects of defaults, post-mortem rights and the potential rights to family 
objection are also approached as well as the differences between theoretical discussion 
and concrete application of public policy. 
Keywords: presumed consent; opt-out; organ procurement; transplantation.  
2 
 
Introduction/Background 
 
The revolutionary technique of organ transplantation appeared as an answer to a 
considerable and growing number of patients suffering from specific organ failures. This 
answer, as all therapeutic innovative procedures, brought with it a series of questions, 
particularly in the ethics and legislative fields – precisely the themes discussed in this 
paper. 
When it comes to these issues the discussion arised not only in the same context as any 
other new medical-surgical intervention but also in one that is intrinsically dependent on 
the concept of transplantation – one had to consider not only the two usual perspectives– 
carer and patient- but also a new dimension or position – the donor’s. When considering 
the latter in addition to all legal necessities to guarantee his protection, when it comes to 
an ethical dimension never before has a procedure given rise to such questions – the 
invasion of someone’s (or his cadaver’s)  physical limits  (physical integrity) in such an 
extensive manner for sole clinical benefit of others. 
This procedure uses two types of sources for transferable organic substrates - living and 
deceased donors – and while, when it comes to authorization and consent, the former can 
be asked about their willingness or not to donate and discuss their concerns and 
motivations, the same cannot be said of the latter, hence the fundamental need to create 
specific regulations for deceased donors. 
In this last group, this decision and its respective statement will obviously have to be 
made pre-mortem, so that if the individual becomes a potential donor, agents can proceed 
accordingly. There are several different legislative schemes for this regulation: 
 Explicit consent/opt-in: Only individuals that have officially registered their will 
to donate are considered post-mortem donors [1]; 
 Presumed consent/opt-out1: All individuals are considered donors after death 
unless they have officially registered their dissent [1]; 
                                                          
1 In this introductory section these terms are used synonymously for mere simplification in the analysis of the policy’s empirical 
results. Later, the diﬀerences between both concepts will be explained and explored. 
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 Mandated choice, routine harvesting and programs involving incentives are other 
options - although their debate may be of great importance, they will not be 
discussed in this paper. 
In both opt-in and opt-out systems the family may have a part to play in the decision (in 
some cases even full decisive power). When it comes to legislation if a "soft" mode is 
adopted, the family will be consulted and may reverse the oﬃcial donation status of the 
deceased, but if a “hard" mode is adopted the law does not give them the right to have 
their opinion considered, let alone be entitled to a final say [2]. However, what is 
legislated is not always applied in clinical practice, as a matter of fact most practitioners 
consult the family and include them in the decision-making, regardless of the system in 
place[1, 3-9]. 
The increase in transplant waiting lists is currently a global problem, with a constantly 
increasing need for organs but very low numbers of available donors. That being, more 
and more patients are accumulating in a list that many believe underestimates the real 
need for organs [10] (for example: the knowledge of organ shortage may discourage 
physicians from enrolling their patients on the waiting list / patients that, after a long 
period of time on the waiting list become too debilitated to undergo major surgery and 
are excluded from it [8]). 
This presents a very complicated situation for patients with organ failure, since in their 
case a transplant could vastly improve their quality of life, cure them or even save their 
lives. Aside from the obvious individual beneﬁts for these patients one must also consider 
a positive financial impact for the health system itself [2], for example savings in chronic 
treatments such as dialysis in potential renal transplant recipients. 
There are several different approaches when it comes to tackling the problematic 
difference between supply and demand that affects organ donation, being that the most 
discussed and debated is an increase in supply. Other suggested options (not necessarily 
less important) would be to implement measures to reduce the demand, prevent the waste 
of available organs or promote the development of new techniques and improvement of 
existing ones.  
One particular measure that may play an important role in solving this issue, particularly 
regarding an increased supply of available organs, would be the implementation of a 
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presumed consent policy in cadaveric donation 2[17], a legislation already in place in most 
European countries (21 of the 25 European Union member states)[1]. This measure will 
be the main focus of discussion in this paper.  
There are different perspectives when it comes to the direct results of an opt-out policy 
in the number of post-mortem organ donations, but in fact almost all authors agree that 
donation rates are higher in countries where it is in place [3, 7, 18, 19]. 
Many argue that these results are not a direct consequence of legislation differences, but 
are instead the resulting effect of other confounding factors [11, 15, 18]. Among others it 
is mentioned that a switch to this type of system (only) demonstrates a more serious 
commitment towards increasing transplantable organs – the change in policy may have 
been just one of many measures applied with this goal in mind, being that the rest can act 
as confounders when evaluating the legislation’s direct consequences [3, 18]. It is also 
discussed that other factors influence the effect of this policy on donation rates, in 
particular the consultation of next-of-kin [1, 18] and the registration system used 
(registration of consent/dissent/both) [7, 18], among others. The international 
discrepancies concerning these and other factors make conclusions about the data even 
more difficult [1, 11]. 
Two noteworthy facts are that despite the overall results described above not all countries 
have increased their donation rates after implementing this policy [15, 20, 21] and also 
that a considerable decrease in transplantation from living donors seems to affect 
countries where it is in place [3, 19]. 
As stated above the family is in most cases consulted regardless of the donation policy in 
place, and the fact that they, more often than not, have a ﬁnal decision about the 
donation[4, 10, 16, 22] coupled with the fact that family consent varies according to the 
degree of explicitness of consent[22] (the more explicit the consent the more probable is 
                                                          
2 Several authors consider it unlikely that the isolated implementation of such a policy is able to solve donation problems by itself [5, 
11, 12]. According to these an integrated and multidisciplinary approach (which does not necessarily need to include a change in 
legislation) is needed if the goal is to increase the number of donations [2, 13]. It is also said that an exclusive approach of this kind 
will have the risk (among others) of diverting  attention from other measures that could be easier to apply and perhaps even more 
eﬀective [1, 10, 14, 15], particularly ones aiming to decrease organ necessity/demand such as primary, secondary and tertiary 
prevention programs that can potentially reduce the incidence of terminal organ failures[16]. 
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the acceptance[6, 7]3) may end up diluting to some extent the direct effects of consent 
legislation change.  
Despite these facts there is a study stating that countries where family consent is not 
legally required exhibit roughly double the average donation rates when compared to 
countries where consent is required[7]. According to the authors a possible explanation 
is that different family approaches are used in each case, being that in the first case the 
family is simply informed that the donation will occur and that they have the possibility 
to object while in the second  they are directly asked for permission to proceed [7]. 
In line with what was described the family ends up having a vital role when it comes to 
donation, affecting its results  as much or more than the legal system in place[13]. That 
being so it represents a very important factor on which to intervene in an attempt to 
increase the number of actual donors [5-7, 17]. 
With this review we aim to organize, compare and present the different perspectives 
approached in the most recent literature concerning the ethical and social implications 
that the establishment of presumed consent for organ donation may bring. 
  
                                                          
3 In a presumed consent system we may have a larger pool of potential donors but families with less certainty of the deceased’s will. 
In contrast, under a system of explicit consent we have a smaller donor pool but a family with more assurance of the deceased’s will 
to donate because that intent has been registered. However, one must consider that that this can be countered if the change to presumed 
consent provokes a paradigm shift that turns donation into something natural and expected[8] - defaults may change perspectives - as 
will be discussed later on. 
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Methods 
 
To obtain a literary base for this review concerning the ethics of a presumed consent (opt-
out) system applied to organ donation, a search was conducted in  the 
MEDLINE®/PubMed® database using the following query (MeSH terms): “(tissue 
procurement) AND (presumed consent)”. The search was limited to papers published in 
the last five years so as to obtain the latest perspectives regarding the issue at hand. The 
following filters were also applied to the search: full text availability and Portuguese, 
English or Spanish language. The final result was 78 papers. All articles that after reading 
the title, abstract or full text were considered to be out of the scope of this project (34) 
were excluded. 2 articles could not be accessed. 
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Results/Discussion 
 
Autonomy is a fundamental principle in medical care [10, 23]. The concept of choice and 
consent takes a central role on modern societies and in what deﬁnes us as individual 
beings capable of reasoning, therefore such decisions (if voluntary and based on adequate 
information) must be respected, giving the individual the resources to defend his own 
values, goals and aspirations[12]. 
As stated earlier, while on almost every scenario the individual can reflect and make a 
decision to authorize or refuse when the situation presents itself, deceased organ donation 
presents a very particular case since it concerns procedures that are performed post-
mortem and logically decisions and eventual actions to allow or refuse it must be 
performed pre-mortem. 
It is not infrequent the opinion that people have interests even after their passing and these 
may be valued because they were significant to them while they were alive, to promote a 
socially desirable behavior or even as a way of familial psychological protection [24]. 
Accordingly, the premise commonly used is that a person has the right to decide what 
others may or may not do to her own body both during life and after their death[24, 25] 
which will mean that the removal of her organs without consent is wrong [10, 16, 25]. 
The core ethical discussion concerning this theme therefore consists  of comparing two 
forces at play: the shortage of transplantable organs and concerns about autonomy, choice 
and consent [12]. Actually what is being discussed is whether or not it is possible to base 
an opt-out policy in an ethically acceptable type of consent or even if, to some extent, this 
policy would not be ethically justified even if it did not fulfill all conventional parameters 
of consent.  
The term "presumed consent" is often used as a synonym for an opt-out system as it was 
in the introductory section but these terms, actually, do not have the same meaning.  
“Presumed consent” in its purest and most basic meaning applied to organ donation is 
used as follows: it is presumed that someone consented to the removal of their organs 
when, during their life, they have not registered their dissent.  
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Another widely used approach is to use this term as a synonym for an opt-out policy when 
in reality it is just an example of a possible justification for this type of system. 
The main practical component of an opt-out policy is that the default position becomes 
the removal of the individual’s organs, being that in the case of an oﬃcial registration of 
dissent, it is not performed. As stated earlier the contrary happens under opt-in systems 
in which non-donation is the default procedure and donation requires registration. 
In the following section the main topics of discussion concerning the adoption of an opt-
out system will be approached, starting with the discussion of presumed consent itself as 
a possible jusﬁcation for this type of policy. We chose a topic organized structure not 
because the themes are unrelated but simply to facilitate their analyses. 
 
1. May consent really be presumed? 
Within the consulted literature there isn’t a single article that supports presumption of 
consent as a plausible jusﬁcation for implementing an opt-out system. Several authors 
even question the real validity of the concept, defending that consent consists of an action 
and not a mental attitude or decision and one can’t presume that an action has taken place 
if one knows for a fact it hasn’t [13, 25, 26]. 
One situation when it is generally accepted to apply a presumption of consent is the 
requirement of an invasive procedure in a medical emergency with an unconscious 
patient, but even in this situation it may be argued that it is not presumed that consent has 
been given, it is presumed that the patient in question would consent if he had the capacity 
to do so, being that the justification for such presumption lies on acting in the patient’s 
best interests[13]. The same can’t be said when considering organ donation, it is not 
legitimate to appeal that it was in the individual’s best interest to have his organs 
removed[13]. 
 
2. Implicit/tacit consent 
Instead of basing an opt-out system in a presumption of consent it may be argued that, if 
certain conditions are met, when an individual fails to register an objection consent has 
been given, although implicitly – the inaction in itself can be a sign of consent - making 
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presumptions unnecessary [22, 25, 26]. The aforementioned conditions are as follows: 
the meaning of inaction must be a matter of general knowledge[25]; dissent registration 
must be practically effortless[25, 26]; all information about the procedure and its 
consequences must be easily accessible4 [25]. In this situation those that  register  their 
dissent will not be submitted to the procedure and only the ones that have not done so 
(those that have implicitly consented) will, so according to the authors, this justification 
respects the premise that the removal of organs is wrong if performed absent consent [25, 
26]. 
In regard to the mental attitude that underpins the action of consenting (in this case 
implicitly) diﬀerent opinions arise: 
Some consider that by not recording his objection the individual is consenting regardless 
of his true feelings about the procedure, arguing that the mental attitude or intention is 
irrelevant if he actually consents - “no different from…someone who signs a consent form 
without intending to consent”[26]. 
Others strongly disagree : if a consent procedure doesn’t accurately reflect the real 
opinion / will / mental decision of the subject won’t it mean that we are using some kind 
of manipulation and therefore isn’t the procurement of the consenting individual’s organs 
immoral [22]? Although agreeing that in an ideal situation implicit consent could 
determine with good accuracy the exact will of the individual, this author considers that 
in this case an opt-out system gives few guarantees of approval-tracking [22]. This 
author’s ideas are in line with others’ when they state that approval or willingness to 
donate is something that is essential to the whole process[27]. It may however be argued 
that, in truth, there is no way to understand the desires and opinions of others if not by 
their actions, consequently (if certain conditions are met) one may say that an opt-out 
system is sufficiently approval tracking because people who disagree will have registered 
their dissent [28].  
Although these last ideas may seem conflicting, even some authors who advocate intent as 
an essential part of donation agree that opt-out remains a voluntary system of donation 
                                                          
4 Regarding the need for informed consent in organ donation (in which the potential donors are well informed about the procedure’s 
consequences, beneﬁts and other details) opinions diﬀer: some authors defend that guarantees that the individual is adequately 
informed are fundamental to the validity of the consent given [16] while others argue that easy access to such information already 
validates their consent - the individual can choose whether or not to inform himself of the details regarding the procedure [25, 27].  
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since there is a right to refuse even though, when it comes to donors, it may not be as 
accurately approval tracking as an opt-in system[27]. 
Various authors disagree, believing that just as it cannot be presumed one cannot 
accurately infer consent from inaction since it may happen for various reasons (ignorance 
or inertia towards official registration among others5) other than a purposeful act of 
implicit consent [9, 10, 16, 29]. Some even go further arguing that an opt-in system is the 
only way to provide clear evidence that the person wanted and intended to donate [10, 
16].  
 
3. Is consent really necessary? 
As previously mentioned the generally accepted premise is that it is wrong to proceed 
without consent and for some authors this is dogmatic, claiming that the only scenario in 
which it may be acceptable to remove an individual’s organs is when there is clear 
evidence that this was his will, without room for speculations or assumptions [16]. 
However, others defend that an opt-out policy can be justified not based on any 
presumption or inferrment but on a theory that rejects the very premise of consent 
requirement [29, 30]. Based on a concept of “normative consent” –“ when it is wrong to 
withhold consent to something, the moral force of that lack of consent may be null and 
void”[30] -  it is argued that it is morally wrong for the majority of the population not to 
consent to the collection of their organs (small individual effort vs. great benefit for 
others6) and consequently their consent for such procedure may not be necessary[29, 30].  
According to the authors, this concept would be applicable using an opt-out system 
because, although people who do not register their dissent are considered donors, people 
with strong anti-donation feelings (and ones who simply for their own reasons, do not 
wish to donate) have the power to register their rejection and therefore not be subject to 
the intervention [29-31].  
One of these authors takes this argument further and in a different direction by introducing 
the possibility of a new premise in which to base further discussion, it being that donation 
                                                          
5 An opt-in system may be subject to symmetric criticism: It is possible that not all citizens are aware of the possibility to donate or 
don´t know how to register their intent [25]. 
6 Vide infra the discussion about the concept of “easy rescue”. 
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is always permissible unless the individual refuses - the act of refusal would have the 
power to change the initial status quo – if this premise is taken to be true, consent would 
not only not be required but in reality would not even be applicable [29].  
It is counter-argued nonetheless that this concept’s use in this situation would more 
coherently justify an organ conscription policy – the indiscriminate procurement of 
organs – unbalancing towards totalitarianism a supposedly democratic system [32]. Its 
advocates disagree stating that, by allowing people the possibility to register as non-
donors, this system maintains voluntariness [27], personal autonomy and choice[29-31] 
as part of the process.  
Finally, according to the author’s line of thought, an opt-out policy would have the 
objective of facilitating potential donations not because the subjects consent but because 
they do not object to it [8]. 
3.1. Individuality vs. Community – Easy rescue 
“Transplantation is a community endeavor that requires community obligation because it 
can only be achieved through organ donation”[27] - The very process of organ donation 
demands not only a discussion from the individual’s point of view but also one that 
focuses on his part as member of a community.  
Several authors argue that in most citizens’ cases organ donation represents a situation of 
easy rescue since they are saving someone’s life (or enhancing their quality of life) at 
little or no cost to themselves [29, 30, 33]. For this reason according to them there is a 
duty to donate/consent to donating [30], even more so when the objective is to help fellow 
citizens [30], being that some even compare refusal to withholding help from someone in 
need [33]. 
According to this argument because “most people do not sacrifice anything of moral 
significance when their organs are removed”, they have the moral duty [33] or even an 
obligation [31, 33] to donate. Because there is a possibility that the moral significance of 
the action represents too great a cost to bear from the individual’s point of view (or even 
his family’s [31]) he has at all times the right to register his objection[30]. 
Other authors, defending an even closer connection between individuals in a community, 
advocate that, in a democratic society facing such a serious problem there may be 
justifications to limit some rights that may constrain deceased donation (such as the right 
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to privacy and family life or the right to conscience and religion) in order to protect the 
potential recipients at risk [12]. In line with this train of thought, theoretically it can even 
seem justifiable resorting to a system in which the right to object would be dependent on 
the reason presented or even a system where there is no right for refusal, but for practical 
and political but also theoretical reasons it may seem better to allow any individual who 
feels this inclination as well as the motivation to act upon it the right to register it [33]. 
Not as a justification  but rather as a potential effect of the establishment of this policy it 
is suggested that it may help people understand more clearly the way in which they can 
be physically independent but at the same time invested in their community’s interests 
[33]. 
Regarding the notion of easy rescue some authors nonetheless argue that while it is 
currently advocated as a duty to provide basic assistance in an emergency, its employment 
to the case in question, such an invasive procedure, would be going too far, treating 
“people” as mere means to an end [16]. 
3.2. The autopsy example  
Nowadays in many countries autopsies are performed ,when required under the law, 
without the individual’s [13, 25, 34] or his family’s [17] consent or a possibility for 
refusal, even though they can also be considered to be a violation of the physical integrity 
of the corpse[33, 34]. To ethically validate this procedure a principle of justice is evoked, 
being that some authors argue that if these are ethically accepted justifications why isn’t 
it  ethically accepted to perform similar interventions when the principle at play is much 
more important (if not the most important of all) – the preservation of life[34]?7.  
 
4. Defaults 
The real difference that comes with a change of policy from opt-in to opt-out systems can 
be defined as changing the default position from non-donation to donation [13] and the 
different effects defaults may have are due to a variety of factors:  
                                                          
7 One possible justification for this fact is presented: autopsies may be publicly more acceptable because they may serve the purpose  
of fulfilling the family’s doubts regarding the death[23]. 
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When it comes to organ donation as well as in so many other situations one can say that 
certain types of inertia interpose between the real wishes of an individual and the act of 
both making a decision and acting upon it [10, 29]. This clearly affects donation rates in 
opt-in systems, in which they can be quite lower than the reported will to donate [35]. It 
is almost unanimous that whatever the policy implemented it will inevitably be affected 
by this phenomenon [30]. 
It is a fact that defaults affect personal choice[35], in their decision people feel they need 
to have very strong reasons to deviate from the default and in cases of doubt the default 
is usually chosen [25]. A recent study shows that different default positions (different 
policies) alter the very meaning people attach to being a donor as well as the way they 
scale it as a moral obligation, thus taking effect in their decisions[36]. Participation or 
non-participation as a donor depends very much on the individual and collective meaning 
that is assigned to the choice at hand: When the default is organ donation the act seems 
like something natural, that everyone does unless some extraordinary factor renders the 
individual particularly reluctant to donate. On the other hand when the default is not to 
donate, the act appears to be something noteworthy and exceptional, not something one 
would do absent motive [36]. 
Some authors find the change of meaning that comes with a change in default a negative 
consequence, because in their opinion an opt-out system turns the act of donation into a 
default rather than a selfless act of solidarity [35] or a voluntary gift [10], depriving it of 
its altruistic meaning – even arguing that some recipients find it easier to accept the organs 
knowing they were voluntarily given [10]. Opposing this perspective others argue that, 
actually, the main objective should be to save lives, not to make people feel good about 
donating [8] because the main value of donation is instrumental, not expressive[26]. And 
besides, making the morally correct process easier does not invalidate or diminish its 
expressive value [26].   
Specifically arguing in favor of an opt-out system several authors believe that the choice 
(they consider) morally correct should be the default[25, 31], leaving the burden of 
registration to people opposing it (making the less morally correct choice) [28]. From the 
community’s point of view and in agreement with the referenced study, some say that one 
positive change possibly brought by an opt-out system could be a change of mentality, to 
instill an understanding that this should be the expected behavior of any citizen[37] while 
underlining the value of community involvement towards common good[33]. A change 
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in this direction may represent the establishment of a new perspective - facing donation 
as an acceptable and even natural part of dying [3]. 
 
5. Is the removal of organs from people who don’t agree really worse 
than the non-donation of the ones’ who agree? 
Whatever the policy in place there is no doubt there will be “mistakes” [13, 22, 30]: 
By leaving to the dissenters the burden of officially registering their position, there is a 
risk that some people will have their organs removed against their will (because they 
never registered their opinion) [10, 13, 14, 29],  this may even be one of the main reasons 
some members of the public oppose the implementation of an opt-out policy [13, 29]. 
On the other hand, using an opt-in policy there would be people willing to donate their 
organs but whose organs aren’t used for the same reason[13]. Can one really say that the 
compromise of a right to self-determination is greater in the first than in the second 
case[8]? Wouldn’t one be right in also considering the consequent needless loss of 
(quality of) life of the potential recipients when comparing both situations[8]? 
In this case the severity of each fault must be compared in light of the magnitude we 
attribute to two different rights: the right not to have our mortal remains tampered with 
without consent vs. the right to a decision regarding their use [22], being that some authors 
vehemently defend that in this case action without consent would be more objectionable 
than inaction despite consent[24, 25]. 
 
6. Post-mortem rights 
What is the cadaver? Some authors state that the person in herself does not survive death, 
at least not her corporeal form as her body ceases to exist leaving in its place what is 
described as “non-unified remains of an earlier living body”[38]. Therefore, this can 
represent another argument in favor of adopting an opt-out system because, if the stated 
premise is right, it is not the person or the person’s body that will be tampered with, so 
even if in that context the intervention is carried out without consent, neither the person’s 
autonomy nor her rights to physical integrity or self-determination are compromised 
because they are not applicable [38]. It may be argued that if this is so, it doesn’t make 
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sense for people to have the right to refuse donation, but as referred by one particular 
author “it is consistent to give people a choice even if they have no right to it”[26]. 
Nonetheless this theory has its critics who, disagreeing with such a drastic separation 
between person and cadaver, claim that those rights are in fact applicable and are 
consequently insulted when there is organ procurement without consent[16].   
 
7. Does death really precede the intervention and the preparation 
towards it? 
The search for an accurate definition of the concept as well as the moment of death is the 
focus of an everlasting discussion.  
This topic may be relevant for the argument at hand because, if it is considered that the 
person is still alive during the procedure or the preparation for it, one may say that it 
invalidates the easy rescue principle on which to base an opt-out system (and with it the 
previously discussed “normative consent” factor)[32]. Accepting this fact it is discussed 
that the dignity of the process of dying or even the person’s own dignity may be 
compromised  [23] submitting her to procedures, some of them very invasive, with no 
clinical benefit to her as goal[16]. However, couldn’t taking what was stated as a fact, be 
taken even further calling into question the very process of cadaveric donation? (since we 
would be taking organs from people who are still alive or even anticipating their “death” 
in the process)[31]. 
Despite its described importance, the discussion of the concept and time of death is 
beyond the scope of this paper.   
 
8. Minorities 
It is stated that an opt-out system, by allowing people to register their disagreement would 
not be prejudicial to people with religious beliefs that go against this type of 
procedures[30].  
Anyway it is also suggested that as a safeguard measure certain ethnic or religious 
minority groups may choose to register their refusal as a community[10], just as can be 
decided on a state level not to apply this kind of system to the mentally incapable and 
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non-citizens (a policy already in place in countries like Belgium and Singapore) [23]. 
Specifically regarding the first two mentioned groups this measure can, however, cause 
social discomfort regarding the appropriate distribution of efforts/duties as well as 
questions about the role that an autonomous individual decision should play in this 
process [10]. 
 
 
9. Family 
Consulting the family during the decision process (essential according to some[10]) may 
be seen as a safeguard of the system so as to ensure that the actual wishes of patient are 
respected[8, 23] (as long as dialogue about the theme is promoted[39]) and also as 
important to the families themselves, because they can find comfort in being part of the 
decision[10]. 
An opt-in system may bring more assurance to the family that the deceased effectively 
wanted to donate his organs because that wish will be officially registered [22, 27] but on 
the other hand an opt-out system may allow even more protection for individuals who do 
not want to donate, since there is an official registry of their will that may serve as a guide 
for unsure family members [8, 28]. Still noteworthy is the fact that, as it affects potential 
donors’ perspectives about donation, a change to an opt-out system can potentially have 
the same effect on the family’s decision [8]. 
But should family opposition really prevent the procedure? [12]. According to some, 
organ removal against the will of the family can be inappropriate, counter-productive and 
even damage the doctor-patient-family relationship [10], but won’t giving them a final 
say allow their views and opinions to overshadow the deceased’s decisions [8, 16, 23],  
going against all principles of autonomy and respect for individual freedom[12, 23, 27]? 
Another advantage of a system that does not consult the family or at least does not directly 
depend on its authorization, may be that it relieves them of the heavy burden of making 
a decision at such an emotionally charged moment  [12], and although some say this 
argument may come across as paternalistic, others consider that by doing so we would be 
relieving them of a decision that shouldn’t be theirs in the first place[12].  
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Despite what was described, it may be reasonable to think that implementing a system 
that does not involve families could create public discomfort [23] as well as cause mistrust 
towards the donation program or even the national health system itself  [10]. This could 
have very negative consequences since the family’s feelings are very important to the 
actual success of this type of policy[23] - besides their possible contribution towards the 
decision, their support is also essential when it comes to providing information about the 
deceased that may be relevant to the procedures[10]. 
 
10. Public policy 
There are important differences between the theoretical discussion of a subject and the 
discussion of its real application as a policy or law since (among other aspects) the second 
requires one to take into account the context in which it would be applied – in this case a 
certain community with a certain background [33, 40] (for example regarding organ 
donation the political context is of the upmost importance[12, 29, 40]). 
A policy like the one discussed here can (specially if poorly justified) trigger negative 
feelings in the general population: it can be perceived as a loss of autonomy [41], as some 
type of governmental intrusion on individual choices[14, 29, 33] or even as a state’s 
attempt to claim ownership over its citizen’s remains[33]. Any type of bad publicity or 
distorted interpretation of the system may generate anti-donation feelings possibly 
causing the mass registration of people as non-donors jeopardizing the very goal it aimed 
achieving [14, 33, 37]. 
Concerning organ donation therefore it is not just what may seem theoretically justified 
that is important, but also what will seem justified in the eyes of the public  [33], relevant 
in this particular case mainly because no donation policy can work absent public 
support[10, 42]. In conclusion, when it comes to effectively implementing these 
legislations, public opinion surveys regarding donation in general and will to donate, as 
well as concerning specific donation policies (maybe including to some extent its 
justifications) and rights to family objection may be of the upmost importance. 
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Final Considerations 
When it comes to empirical results, the direct effects of an opt-out policy cause 
differences of opinion, but these are much greater regarding the ethical discussion.  
Concerning the first, it is important to highlight that in fact countries with this policy in 
place have higher donation rates, although it seems difficult to establish causality. This 
difficulty may be attributed to the almost exclusive use of observational studies and it will 
not be easy to overcome since, by the very nature of the matter in question, experimental 
studies are very difficult or even impossible. 
As far as the second goes, the argument is complex and a variety of themes are debated, 
however the main focus remains, as initially described, on the different opinions 
regarding the relative importance of two basic ideas: the perspective of the donor 
individual reflected on the importance of autonomy and the requirement of clear and 
explicit consent, and the perspective of potential recipients and the community as a whole 
defending the urgent need to increase organ availability. 
First of all it is important to underline the general rejection of “presumed consent” as a 
concept, based on the incoherence of presuming an action that is known not to have taken 
place. 
The policy in question may, nonetheless, be defended using other arguments:  
 Some preserve the premise of consent necessity (“implicit consent”) – in this first 
case it is stated that if the meaning of inaction is generally known, information is 
easily available and registrating dissent is effortless, if someone does not register 
he is, by his inaction, implicitly consenting;  
 Others, on the other hand, reject it (“normative consent”) - in this second case the 
claim is based on the principle that there is a moral obligation to help when from 
one’s minimal sacrifices can result substantial benefit to others (easy-rescue 
effect); 
However, none of these theories is immune to criticism or counter-argument.  
Besides justifications, potential effects of this system are discussed as it can change 
people’s perspectives towards donation turning it into something natural and generally 
accepted – this phenomenon could be an important fact to address in future discussion. 
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Also stressed throughout the literature is the real importance family members have in the 
decision, even when they have no legal right to it. Taking this into account, once again 
two conflicting forces are compared : the compromise of the deceased’s authority and 
autonomy when relatives have the final say versus the potential discomfort felt by the 
families for not being a part of the decision process. 
Despite what great relevance the theoretical discussion of these issues may have, it is 
fundamental to have in mind that in discussion is a legal measure that will regulate a 
procedure associated with a heavy emotional component, and therefore it is as important 
to have an ethically valid proposal as is the coherent application of measures and the 
public presentation of an explanation that people can both understand and relate to.  
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